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Anti-Reductionism and Supervenience 
MICHAEL RIDGE*
Department of Philosophy 
Edinburgh, UK 
mridge@staffmail.ed.ac.uk 
In this paper, I argue that anti-reductionist moral realism still has trouble 
explaining supervenience. My main target here will be Russ Shafer-
Landau’s attempt to explain the supervenience of the moral on the natural 
in terms of the constitution of moral property instantiations by natural 
property instantiations. First, though, I discuss a recent challenge to the 
very idea of using supervenience as a dialectical weapon posed by Nicholas 
Sturgeon. With a suitably formulated supervenience thesis in hand, I try to 
show how Shafer-Landau’s proffered strategy to explain supervenience not 
only fails to explain supervenience, but that it also has a number of implau-
sible consequences. The more general lesson is that strategies which may 
work well for explaining supervenience in the philosophy of mind and other 
areas cannot be assumed to carry over successfully to the metaethical con-
text. We should therefore treat so-called ‘companions in guilt’ arguments in 
this area of philosophy with considerable skepticism. 
Keywords: expressivism; moral realism; non-naturalism; reductionism; super-
venience; trope 
ccording to anti-reductionist forms of normative realism, normative 
predicates purport to refer to normative properties, and these properties 
are not properly understood in any non-normative or purely descriptive 
vocabulary. On these views, any attempt to reduce the normative to the non-
normative is doomed to fail. Normative properties are sui generis, and must be 
understood on their own terms. G.E. Moore famously defended a non-natu-
ralist version of anti-reductionism, according to which normative properties 
(in Moore’s case, specifically moral ones, and more specifically goodness) are 
not only irreducible, they are non-natural. What being non-natural came to 
in Moore’s sense is slightly obscure, though it is nowadays often understood 
in terms of whether the property in question would figure in any ideal empiri-
cal science or be reducible to properties which would so figure.1 By contrast, 
 * Many thanks to Brad Majors, Sean McKeever, David Robb, Russ Shafer-Landau, 
Nicholas Sturgeon, the participants of my presentation of this material at Davidson College, 
and the participants of the Cambridge Metaethics Conference. 
 1. For a survey of the bewildering senses given to ‘natural’ and ‘non-natural’ in this 
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other anti-reductionist views insist that though the normative is irreducible, 
it is in some important sense natural all the same. Here I want to discuss a
problem for all forms of anti-reductionism about normative properties, regard-
less of whether the view in question takes those properties to be natural or
non-natural.
 The problem will be familiar to those who know the existing literature on 
non-naturalism in metaethics. The argument begins with the following prem-
ise. There can be no normative difference without some non-normative or 
descriptive difference as well. The normative in this sense ‘supervenes’ on the 
non-normative and descriptive, or so I shall argue. Indeed, the supervenience 
of the normative, when properly formulated, is plausibly characterized as 
analytic. Someone who denied a suitably formulated supervenience thesis 
would thereby give evidence that he is not a fully competent user of norma-
tive terms. Given supervenience, the very idea of an irreducible normative 
property begins to look somewhat obscure. The challenge put to anti-reduc-
tionists is to explain how there could be normative properties which both
necessarily supervene and are irreducible. In this paper I want to consider 
and rebut two attempts to deal with the challenge. 
 The first strategy for dealing with this challenge has recently been put for-
ward (in unpublished work in progress) by Nicholas Sturgeon. Sturgeon argues 
that while most metaethical views can accommodate some form of superveni-
ence, there is no single formulation of supervenience which is hospitable to 
all prima facie plausible metaethical views. Just which form of supervenience 
one endorses will on this account depend on one’s background meta-ethical 
theory. If this argument succeeds then it puts pressure on the anti-realist who 
argues that non-naturalists cannot explain supervenience. For perhaps the
only form of supervenience which non-naturalists can be expected to accept 
without begging any central questions is indeed a form of that doctrine which
they can, after all, explain. 
 In section one, I respond to Sturgeon’s interesting line of argument in a 
concessive way. I think we do indeed learn something important from 
Sturgeon’s critique, but the lesson is not that there is no form of superveni-
ence which can be used as a dialectical weapon in these debates. Instead, 
Sturgeon’s own argument actually suggests a formulation of supervenience 
which does not beg any central questions, and which therefore could reasona-
bly be used in a premise against one or another metaethical view. In section 
one I try to show how a suitably disjunctive characterization of the subveni-
ent base avoids any reasonable controversy of the sort Sturgeon has in mind. 
In the remainder of this paper I try to show why anti-reductionist views will 
have problems explaining even this form of supervenience. 
 The second strategy for dealing with the challenge to explain supervenience 
takes a more direct approach. Here I focus on Russ Shafer-Landau’s recent
                                                                                                                        
domain, see M. Ridge, ‘Moral Non-Naturalism’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2005), 
http://www.seop.leeds.ac.uk/entries/moral-non-naturalism/. 
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attempt to meet the challenge by explaining supervenience in anti-reductionist 
terms. In the remainder of the paper, I argue Shafer-Landau’s strategy fails, 
and that the failure is instructive. For Shafer-Landau’s strategy seems like 
one of the most promising ones available to the anti-reductionist. Shafer-
Landau tries to show how what he takes to be the most promising strategy 
for explaining supervenience in the philosophy of mind can be carried over 
successfully to the normative domain. In particular, he argues that in both 
cases, we can adequately explain supervenience by appealing to a thesis 
about how each instantiation of any of the supervening properties is fully 
constituted by some concatenation of the relevant subvening properties. 
 I argue here that even if this strategy works in the philosophy of mind, it 
remains problematic in the normative case. The possibility of such a divide 
between the normative realm and other cases of supervenience is itself very 
instructive. For anti-reductionists (Shafer-Landau included) very often rely 
on ‘companions in guilt’ style arguments. These arguments rely on the idea 
that a supposed problem in the normative case is really just a variant on a 
problem encountered in other areas of philosophy, and that whatever solu-
tion works in that other area can be carried over to the normative case. The 
more general lesson of my argument against Shafer-Landau’s proposed expla-
nation is that such ‘companions in guilt’ arguments should be viewed with 
considerable suspicion. Strategies which are perfectly plausible in other 
domains may not carry over plausibly to the normative, or so I shall argue. 
First, though, we need to clarify just how the supervenience of the normative 
should itself be understood. 
1. Supervenience: Formulating the Challenge 
Supervenience theses come in all different shapes and sizes, though. Debates 
in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind have led to the development of a 
wide array of different supervenience theses.2 How exactly should we formu-
late supervenience in the context of challenging the normative anti-reduc-
tionist to explain it? 
 Supervenience theses can be global or local. Global supervenience theses 
claim that no two possible worlds can differ in the supervening respect with-
out also differing in the subvening respect. By contrast, local supervenience 
claims hold that two numerically distinct objects in one and the same world 
cannot differ in supervening respects without also differing in the subvening 
respects. 
 One problem for local supervenience claims is that if the subvening base is 
widened far enough—say, to include spatio-temporal location—then super-
venience may be trivially true for the reason that no numerically distinct 
things can be precisely the same in all of the subvening respects. In which 
 2. For a useful survey, see K. Bennett and B. McLaughlin, ‘Supervenience’, Stanford Ency-
clopedia of Philosophy (2005), http://www.seop.leeds.ac.uk/entries/supervenience/#4.3.
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case it becomes trivial that no two things can differ in the supervening respects 
without also differing in subvening respects as well. This will be trivially true 
for the simple reason that no two genuinely distinct things can fail to differ in
some of the subvening respects. Global supervenience theses skirt this prob-
lem by being formulated in terms of whole possible worlds, rather than in 
terms of individuals within the same world. The issue then becomes which 
kinds of worlds really are genuinely possible, and which are not. I propose to 
understand supervenience here as a global thesis, so as to avoid these sorts of 
triviality worries. 
 The other issue is how we should understand the subvening base. Here I 
want to consider a worry recently discussed by Nicholas Sturgeon.3 The 
subvening base is sometimes characterized in terms of the natural properties, 
but the question of just which properties count as natural is itself deeply 
vexed. Moreover, on many ways of understanding the natural it will not be 
true that the normative supervenes on the natural. Plausibly, supernatural 
facts about the next life can give us reasons for action, for example, in which 
case two worlds could differ normatively without differing naturally—super-
natural differences in one’s fate in the afterlife, or differences with respect to 
whether one even has an afterlife, could be enough to explain differences in 
one’s reasons for action. 
 A seemingly more promising approach, often taken in these debates, is to 
maintain that the normative supervenes on the non-normative. This is indeed 
very plausible, but it is not clear that it is analytic. Here the issue seems to 
be too theory-dependent for analyticity. For some forms of descriptivism are 
committed to denying this sort of supervenience thesis. Let me explain why 
this way of defining supervenience may be inhospitable to certain forms of 
descriptivism.
 Consider the descriptivist view that being worthwhile just is being pleasant. 
This may not be a very plausible view, but it is also not uncontroversially 
analytic that it is false. Suppose that the descriptivist we have in mind also 
holds a form of dualism according to which pleasure is itself a basic and 
irreducible property. In that case, the view seems consistent with denying the 
supervenience of the normative on the non-normative. For on the descrip-
tivist view on offer, being worthwhile just is being pleasant; that is, these are 
one and the same property. In that case, though, being pleasant is a nor-
mative property, not a non-normative one. Since being pleasant is, in turn, 
an irreducible property, it seems to follow that two worlds could differ 
 3. In what follows, my thinking has been influenced by an as-yet unpublished paper, 
currently in draft, by Nicholas Sturgeon on supervenience. See Sturgeon (unpublished manu-
script), ‘Doubts About the Supervenience of the Evaluative’. To be clear, as of the time of my 
writing this article, Sturgeon’s own views are still potentially in flux, as he tells me that his 
paper is not in his view ready for publication. I therefore do not attribute any of the ideas 
discussed in the text to him in the sense of representing his considered view, but only in the 
sense of being his ideas, regardless of whether he still endorses them as true or not. 
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normatively without differing non-normatively. For two worlds could differ 
simply in the distribution of pleasantness, given that pleasantness is irredu-
cible. There seems no plausible case, given a thoroughgoing dualism about 
pleasure, for supposing that two worlds could not differ just with respect to 
pleasantness. According to the descriptivist view on offer, though, this differ-
ence between these two worlds (that is, their difference in terms of the distri-
bution of pleasure) is itself a normative difference, and so not a non-normative 
one. So two worlds can, on this metanormative view, differ in their normative
properties without at the same time differing in their nonnormative prop-
erties.
 Another approach to defining supervenience is to insist that the normative 
supervenes on the descriptive, where to be a descriptive property is just to be 
a property which is, or at least can be, picked out in purely descriptive terms. 
This account relies on some way of sorting descriptive from non-descriptive 
terms, of course, but we can perhaps rely on an intuitive sense of how such 
terms are sorted to draw the distinction. This is roughly how Frank Jackson 
proceeds in his defense of the supervenience of the ethical on the descriptive.4
 This approach does not beg any questions against descriptivists, unlike the 
formulation in terms of the non-normative. For the descriptivist will of 
course allow that the normative supervenes on the descriptive for the simple 
reason that the normative just is the descriptive, and everything supervenes 
on itself. 
 However, those who are inclined to reject descriptivism may reasonably 
find the supervenience of the normative on the descriptive problematic. For 
one thing, some philosophers find the very idea of dividing predicates into 
the category of the normative and the descriptive problematic, in which case 
the category of descriptive properties (defined here in terms of descriptive 
predicates) is problematic.  
 I take an ecumenical approach here. For what seems undeniable is that the 
normative either supervenes on the non-normative or on the descriptive.
Those who deny that the normative supervenes on the non-normative because 
they are descriptivists will allow that the normative does supervene on the 
descriptive (trivially). While those who deny that the normative supervenes
on the descriptive because they reject the normative/descriptive distinction 
will nonetheless allow that the normative does supervene on the non-norma-
tive. For the only reason to reject that thesis is apparently a certain form of
descriptivism, and anyone who denies the coherence of the normative/descrip-
tive distinction is ipso facto not a descriptivist, and hence has no grounds for 
rejecting the supervenience of the normative on the non-normative. 
 Let us therefore take as plausible, and indeed analytic, the following very 
modest global supervenience thesis: 
 4. See F. Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998),  
p. 120. 
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(S) Necessarily: Two entire possible worlds cannot differ in their normative prop-
erties without also differing either (a) in their non-normative properties or (b) in 
their descriptive properties. 
(S) is extremely plausible, to the point that someone who denied it would 
thereby betray incompetence with normative concepts. To deny (S) would 
be to allow, for all that has been said so far, that it could have been the case 
that the world was exactly like the actual world in all of its non-normative 
and descriptive features, yet Hitler’s actions were not wrong. Since all the 
non-normative and descriptive facts are the same in this possible world it will 
still be true that Hitler killed the same people, had the same intentions, etc. 
Such bare normative differences seem inconceivable. Very plausibly, the norma-
tive facts are in some way entirely fixed by the non-normative and descrip-
tive facts, and this is something we can know a priori. Indeed, it seems to be 
built into the very meaning of normative discourse, and is in that sense 
analytic. I therefore conclude that supervenience formulated in this way need 
not beg any central questions. 
2. Explaining Supervenience: Companions in
Guilt and Constitution 
Descriptivist forms of realism have an easy time explaining how there could 
be genuine normative properties which satisfy (S), since the supervenience of 
the normative on the descriptive entails (S). By contrast, anti-reductionism 
seems unable to accommodate any plausible explanation of how there could 
be genuine normative properties which satisfy (S). For if normative proper-
ties, non-normative properties, and descriptive properties really are, in Hume’s 
terms, ‘distinct existences’, then it is very hard to see why it should be
impossible for the former to differ with no difference in the latter. In one
version or another, this problem has been put to anti-reductionists many 
times.5
 Expressivism has a much easier time on this front. The crucial point is that 
the expressivist’s explanatory task differs from the explanatory task facing 
the cognitivist. Whereas the cognitivist must explain a metaphysical relation-
ship between two potentially distinct sets of properties, the expressivist 
instead needs only to explain the sensibility of a practice of normative judg-
ment governed by a supervenience constraint. Moreover, it is not hard to see 
how such an account would go. Part of the point of expressivism is that we 
use normative discourse to recommend courses of action on the basis of their 
 5. See, e.g., J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (New York: Penguin Books, 
1977), pp. 38-42; S. Blackburn, Spreading the Word (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 
pp. 182-90; and S. Blackburn, Ruling Passions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 
315-17. Even critics of Blackburn’s argument often allow that it is effective against anti-
reductionist views like Moore’s; see, e.g., J. Dreier, ‘The Supervenience Argument Against 
Moral Realism’, The Southern Journal of Philosophy 30.3 (1992), pp. 13-38, here 17-18.
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non-normative and descriptive properties. We use normative judgments to 
decide what to do in any given non-normatively or descriptively character-
ized circumstance. There could be no sense given to the idea that we were 
recommending actions, or deciding on actions, on the basis of their non-nor-
mative or descriptive features if we did not obey a supervenience constraint 
in making these judgments.  
 How might anti-reductionists reply to the charge that they cannot explain 
how normative properties supervene? One strategy has been to pursue what 
are sometimes called ‘companions in guilt’, though those who deploy this 
strategy might prefer to call it one of ‘companions in innocence’. The idea is 
to argue that we have supervenience in other areas where reductionism does 
not seem plausible, but in which expressivism also does not seem plausible. 
For example, the mental plausibly supervenes on the physical even if the 
mental is not reducible to the physical. Yet almost no one would be tempted 
to infer from this that we should be expressivists about discourse employing 
mentalistic idioms. The argument against anti-reductionism seems to gener-
alize too quickly, or so this line of reply insists. 
 Sometimes, defenders of anti-reductionism supplement the ‘companions 
in guilt’ move with a positive story about supervenience, which is good. The 
companions in guilt approach by itself leaves a bad taste. One always won-
ders whether there might not be some relevant difference between the com-
panions in virtue of which they will at some point part company. 
 What positive story do anti-reductionists offer about supervenience, then? 
They typically appeal to a strategy for explaining supervenience which is 
employed in other contexts (such as the philosophy of mind), and argue that 
this strategy can be carried over and successfully deployed in the normative 
case as well. The most promising version of this strategy appeals to the idea 
that the supervening class of properties (the normative or the mental, for 
example) are constituted by or realized by the subvening class of properties (the 
non-normative/descriptive or the non-mental, for example) This is exactly 
how Russ Shafer-Landau defends his version of non-naturalism. Here is how 
Shafer-Landau puts it: 
According to the sort of ethical non-naturalism that I favour, a moral fact super-
venes on a particular concatenation of descriptive facts just because these facts realize
the moral property in question. Moral facts necessarily covary with descriptive ones 
because moral properties are always realized exclusively by descriptive ones. Just 
as facts about a pencil’s qualities are fixed by facts about its material constitution, 
or facts about subjective feelings by neurophysiological (and perhaps intentional) 
ones, moral facts are fixed and constituted by their descriptive constituents.6
 The strategy combines the companions in guilt approach with an appeal to 
the idea of constitution.7 As Shafer-Landau presents it here, the idea is to 
 6. R. Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
p. 77; emphasis added. 
 7. Or, as seems equivalent in Shafer-Landau’s version, realization. 
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explain the supervenience of the normative on the descriptive by telling a 
suitable story about the constitution of normative facts (and properties) by 
concatenations of descriptive facts (and properties). On Shafer-Landau’s 
ontology, facts just are instantiations of properties,8 and he formulates the 
strategy in terms of the constitution of properties as well as in terms of con-
stitution of facts. 
 Shafer-Landau actually aims to explain a slightly different supervenience 
thesis than the one discussed here, though. He is interested in a superveni-
ence thesis which holds within a single possible world, and maintains that no 
two things within that world have the same normative status without differ-
ing in some descriptive respects. It seems clear, though, that he would extend 
this strategy to deal with the global supervenience thesis advanced here. 
 Shafer-Landau’s positive explanation of supervenience dovetails very nicely 
with the companions in guilt strategy. For the appeal to constitution is sup-
posed to be borrowing the best strategy for the companions. Shafer-Landau 
gives the examples of a pencil and its material constitution and that of a sub-
jective feeling and its neurophysiological (and perhaps intentional) consti-
tuents.
 Crucial to the success of this strategy is the idea that constitution is distinct 
from identity. Otherwise, the view on offer would collapse into a form of
reductionism, with normative properties being identical with certain constel-
lations of descriptive properties. In itself this is not a problem, since consti-
tution by is indeed distinct from identity with. Constitution is asymmetric; 
identity is symmetric. A clay statue is constituted by the lump of clay, but 
the lump of clay is not constituted by the statue; the clay is instead consti-
tuted by certain molecules, which themselves are not constituted by the 
lump of clay, but by various other subatomic particles, and so on. Whereas if 
a = b then it follows that b = a.
 However, matters are not so straightforward. One obvious disanalogy 
between the normative case and the case of companions in guilt is that the 
supervenience of the normative on the non-normative and descriptive is plau-
sibly a priori, and indeed analytic. By contrast the supervenience of the mental 
on the non-mental is hardly a priori, much less analytic. In fact, the majority 
of human beings at various points in history may well have denied the super-
venience of the mental on the non-mental out of an antecedent commitment 
to a certain sort of dualism about the mental. For many religious traditions 
would naturally lead one to such a view of the mental. The same point holds 
about the material constitution of macroscopic objects by subatomic particles. 
Perhaps even more obviously, this constitution relation is not a priori, much 
less analytic. 
 Shafer-Landau does not explicitly address this disanalogy in his discussion, 
but there is at least one interesting move that an anti-reductionist can make 
here. The anti-reductionist can argue that the preceding objection simply 
 8. As he reminds us at Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism, p. 83 n 2.
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assumes that the analyticity of the supervenience of the normative on the 
non-normative/descriptive must be taken as a theorem, rather than an axiom 
in the following sense. The argument assumes that whatever metaphysically 
explains the supervenience of the normative on the non-normative/descrip-
tive must itself be analytic. For otherwise the explanation of supervenience 
will not explain the analyticity of the supervenience thesis. 
 The anti-reductionist can simply reject this premise, though. The anti-
reductionist can insist that the analyticity of supervenience is axiomatic, and 
not derived as a theorem. It is, the reply continues, simply a brute fact about 
our normative concepts that something cannot count as rightness, for exam-
ple, unless it obeys a suitable supervenience constraint. Crucially, on this view 
the explanation of how any given property could actually satisfy the superveni-
ence constraint need not be analytic, or even a priori. Indeed, at some points,
this seems to be Shafer-Landau’s own view of the issue of analyticity.9
 Here is an analogy that might help clarify the defence I am proposing on 
behalf of the anti-reductionist. Suppose that I just stipulate that by ‘shmong’ 
I shall refer to that property which obeys such-and-such supervenience con-
straint, and which is also such that someone who fails to do that which is 
shmong is therefore blameworthy. There shall now be no mystery about why 
facts about which actions are shmong will conform to the relevant super-
venience constraint—that follows trivially from the stipulated meaning of 
shmong. How any given property can count as being the property picked out 
by ‘shmong’, on the other hand, is another matter, and that will involve 
explaining how the property in question satisfies the relevant supervenience 
constraint.
 The explanation of how a given property satisfies the relevant superveni-
ence constraint need not itself be a priori or analytic, though. For we do not 
at this stage need an explanation of why it is analytic that the shmong facts 
supervene in such-and-such way; that follows from a semantic axiom about 
‘shmong’. All we need is an explanation of how ‘shmong’ so defined could 
manage to refer to a given property, and that explanation need not itself be a
priori or analytic. 
 The same sort of argument could, it seems, be given in the case of norma-
tive concepts. The meanings of these concepts are not given by stipulation, 
of course, so the analogy is imperfect. Nonetheless, linguistic facts are true in 
virtue of conventions, and the relevant conventions could just make it axio-
matic by convention that normative discourse is governed by a suitable 
supervenience constraint. The fact that our actual conventions grew up more  
 9. See Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism, p. 88. See also Shafer-Landau’s reply to a critique 
by Robert Mabrito in R. Shafer-Landau, ‘Replies to Critics’, Philosophical Studies 126 (2005), 
pp. 313-29. Mabrito’s critique of Shafer-Landau is also itself worth reading for those inter-
ested in this debate (see R. Mabrito, ‘Does Shafer-Landau Have a Problem with Superveni-
ence?’, Philosophical Studies 126 [2005], pp. 297-311). 
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organically, and were not the result of an act of stipulation, does not preclude
the relevant conventions having this shape. In which case the fact that it is 
analytic that the normative supervenes on the non-normative and descriptive 
is a disanalogy with the other examples of supervenience (e.g. in the phi-
losophy of mind) that makes no difference. 
 There is a residual explanatory question waiting in the wings here, though. 
For why do we have predicates for normative properties as defined by the 
anti-reductionist? The expressivist has an answer to the corresponding ques-
tion for their view, as we have seen. For without the incorporation of a super-
venience constraint, normative discourse could not do the job for which it is 
needed. Without such a constraint, we could not make sense of the idea that 
normative discourse is used to recommend actions on the basis of their non-
normative or descriptive properties, or that normative judgment allows us to 
decide what to do in any given circumstance once the relevant non-normative 
and features are given to us. 
 The anti-reductionist needs either a different answer, or an account of 
how reference to the irreducible property he has in mind is essential to the 
job of recommending actions on the basis of their descriptive properties and 
forming rational plans for contingencies given in purely descriptive terms. It is 
not obvious that either of these strategies can be made to work. Indeed, the 
mere internal consistency of an expressivist discourse shows that reference to
such an irreducible property is not the only way to get these jobs done. In 
which case, it would be mysterious why human beings ubiquitously and cross-
culturally seem to have normative discourse in the sense the anti-reductionist 
suggests (with supervenience simply stipulated by linguistic convention, 
etc.), instead of in the expressivist sense. 
 Here is another way of posing the challenge to the anti-reductionist who 
takes supervenience’s analyticity as axiomatic. Suppose for the sake of argu-
ment that this gets the semantics for ‘good’ correct. Now consider the in-
vented predicate ‘shmood’. The meaning of ‘shmood’ is given as follows: it 
refers to a property just like the property of being good save for this one 
difference—shmoodness does not supervene. Why should we have predicates 
for goodness rather than shmoodness? Perhaps the reply from the anti-reduc-
tionist will be that there could be no property as shmoodness, but then the 
burden of the argument is to explain why this is so. Explaining why there 
could not be such a property will in effect be much the same as explaining 
why goodness must supervene. This is not progress. 
 By contrast, the expressivist explanation of why we would have normative 
discourse which includes a supervenience constraint has the virtue of relying 
on the following fairly uncontroversial premise: as rational agents who need 
to cooperate and coordinate with one another, we need a discourse that can 
allow us to both settle on the thing to do and recommend actions on the 
basis of their non-normative or descriptive properties. Moreover, this explana-
tion does not seem to push the question back a stage in the way that the 
more stipulative anti-reductionist appeal to brute analyticity might. 
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 Most likely, an anti-reductionist explanation of the ubiquity of normative 
discourse in their favored sense will invoke more controversial premises than 
these. I shall not speculate here on how an anti-reductionist might try to tell 
such an etiological story, but leave this as a challenge for their view. For the 
remainder of this essay, though, I put this particular challenge to one side, as 
I do not here have the space to explore the anti-reductionist’s resources for 
meeting it in anything like adequate detail. 
3. Four Challenges 
I now want to present four challenges for anyone defending Shafer-Landau’s 
strategy for explaining supervenience. These challenges do not draw their 
strength from the analyticity of supervenience. The anti-reductionist’s prof-
fered explanation is cast in terms of constitution. We are most familiar in 
ordinary language with the idea of constitution as a sort of mereological 
notion—a whole is constituted by its parts. An army is (partially) constituted 
by the soldiers who make it up; a chess board is constituted by its 64 squares;
a sentence is constituted by the words that make it up; we the people 
constitute a nation, and so on.  
 The anti-reductionist strategy, however, is cast in terms of the constitution 
of facts, where facts, in turn, are understood as instantiations of properties. 
A pencil’s length at a given time, we are told, is constituted by its molecular 
composition at that time.10 An instance of pain, we are told, is constituted 
by a set of neural (and perhaps intentional) events. In like manner, the argu-
ment goes, the admirability of an action is constituted by some set of 
descriptive features. 
 At this point, we need to be very clear about just what we mean when we 
say that an instantiation of a property is constituted by the instantiation of 
some other property or set of properties. Otherwise we will have simply 
traded one mystery (supervenience) for another (constitution of property 
instantiations). This would not be progress. 
 Fortunately, some of Shafer-Landau’s companions (whether in guilt or 
innocence) have some helpful things to say on this front. First of all, meta-
physicians have a name for the instantiations of properties—they call them 
‘tropes’. Tropes are ‘abstract particulars’ which are wholly present in the 
object which instantiate them, but are incapable of being wholly present 
elsewhere at the same time.11
 10. Actually, Shafer-Landau lumps length together with weight and claims that both are 
constituted by molecular composition; see Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism, p. 77. Weight, 
though, is relative to gravitational field, and so is partly constituted by more than the object’s 
molecular composition. Mass would be a much better example for his purposes. This in no 
way undermines the argument, but it is worth getting the examples just right. 
 11. I take this account from D. Robb, ‘The Properties of Mental Causation’, Philosophical 
Quarterly 47 (1997), pp. 178-94, though it seems to be fairly standard fare amongst trope 
theorists.
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 Tropes are distinguished from properties, which are universals. We must 
distinguish the property of being tall (a universal) from my tallness (a trope, 
or abstract particular). Trope theorists sometimes claim that it is an advan-
tage of their view that they do not need to posit a separate realm of uni-
versals. Instead, they suggest that we take universals to be nothing more 
than sets of tropes which resemble one another in relevant respects. Such 
trope theorists are sometimes called ‘trope nominalists’. Other versions of 
trope theory posit universals as existing in some sense above and beyond the 
set of all of their tropes. The arguments developed here should be neutral on 
this front. 
 Tropes are also often taken to be fully determinate, whereas the universals 
they instantiated are determinable. The property of being colored is deter-
minable—there are many ways of being colored. A given instantiation of the 
property of being colored, though (one of its tropes), must be fully determi-
nate, such as a very specific shade and hue of green. 
 Within this framework, we can reformulate Shafer-Landau’s hypothesis. 
He suggests that we can best explain the supervenience of the normative12
on the descriptive by invoking the claim that every normative property is 
fully constituted by the instantiation of some cluster of descriptive proper-
ties. Within the framework of trope theory, this turns out to be the claim 
that every normative trope is constituted by a suitable cluster of descriptive 
tropes. Presumably we can here read ‘constituted by’ literally as meaning 
something like ‘made up of’, in which case the idea of constitution is still 
understood mereologically. So far, so good. 
 How does the thesis that every normative trope is constituted by a suitable 
cluster of descriptive tropes explain supervenience? By itself, it does not 
logically entail supervenience. The thesis is logically consistent with a given 
set of descriptive features constituting the instantiation of a normative prop-
erty in our world, and yet failing to constitute a normative property in 
another world which is otherwise identical to ours. 
 In order to explain supervenience, we need some auxiliary premises. The 
same sort of point in the philosophy of mind emerges nicely in David Robb’s 
discussion of how trope theory can be deployed to explain the supervenience 
of the mental on the physical. Robb offers a thesis he calls ‘trope monism’ 
which is very close to the philosophy of mind analogue of Shafer-Landau’s 
thesis about the normative. In Robb’s sense, trope monism is the thesis that 
every mental trope just is a physical trope, though mental types are not 
 12. Here I take some liberties with Shafer-Landau’s text. He focuses exclusively on the 
moral, and not on the normative more generally. However, I strongly suspect that he would 
want to generalize his account to include non-moral reasons for action too, and to defend a 
kind of anti-reductionist realism there too. Rather, he would have wanted to extend the 
strategy in question when he still believed in this whole approach. Shafer-Landau now rejects 
the strategy discussed in the text on the strength of some of the arguments in the text—most 
specifically, the argument that constitution alone does not explain supervenience. 
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identical with any physical types. This is not precisely the analogue of Shafer-
Landau’s thesis, which claims only that every normative trope is constituted 
by a descriptive trope.  
 The point is that on either way of proceeding, some further assumptions 
are needed to explain supervenience: 
Trope monism, as I have formulated it, entails Supervenience (which, I shall 
assume, concerns types) so long as we are allowed two plausible assumptions: (a) 
if x=y, then necessarily x=y, and (b) if a trope is an F-trope, then it necessarily 
is an F-trope. Whenever a mental type is present, this will be in virtue of the 
fact that a mental trope is instantiated; but by trope monism, this will also be a 
physical trope, which means that a physical type is present. By (a) this mental 
trope will necessarily be accompanied by the physical one (they are just the 
same trope), and by (b), this trope will necessarily be a trope of the same phy-
sical and mental types. So whenever a mental type is present, a physical type 
that necessitates it will be as well; and if this is necessarily true, the result is 
Supervenience.13
 Robb’s strategy can be adapted in service of Shafer-Landau’s theory as 
follows. Let us assume that (a*) if x necessarily constitutes y then whenever x 
is present, y is present too, and (b*) if a trope constitutes an F-trope, then it 
necessarily constitutes an F-trope. Shafer-Landau’s hypothesis entails that 
whenever a normative type is present this will be in virtue of the fact that a 
cluster of descriptive tropes (the one which constitutes the normative trope 
in this case) is instantiated. By (b*), this cluster of descriptive tropes neces-
sarily constitutes the normative trope in question. By (a*), it follows that 
whenever the cluster of descriptive tropes is present the normative one will 
be too. So whenever a normative property is instantiated, it will be instanti-
ated by a cluster of descriptive properties, and the presence of this cluster of 
descriptive properties necessitates the presence of the normative property. If 
this is necessarily true (assuming [a*] and [b*] are true), then the superveni-
ence of the normative on the descriptive follows. 
 Before explaining why I find this strategy problematic, it is important to be 
clear about the dialectic. Although I have followed Blackburn in posing the 
challenge as one of ‘explaining supervenience’, this is potentially misleading. 
Supervenience is analytic, and so perhaps in a sense does not stand in need 
of explanation. What does stand in need of explanation is how there could be 
properties which are irreducible yet supervene in this way. Supervenience tells 
only that if there are moral properties then they must be like this: they must
supervene in such-and-such ways. That in itself is compatible with an error 
theory, according to which there are no such properties and indeed with  
the conclusion that there could not be such properties. Moreover, Mackie 
famously argued that there could be no such properties precisely on the 
strength of worries about supervenience, among other worries. This is the real  
 13. Robb, ‘The Properties of Mental Causation’, p. 187. 
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challenge: to explain how normative properties, understood in anti-reduction-
ist terms, are as much as possible, given the modal properties attributed to 
them by supervenience. The fact that supervenience itself is a trifling and 
analytic truth does nothing to dispense with this very real explanatory 
burden.14
 In fairness to Shafer-Landau, I should note that he has indicated (in 
correspondence) that he is not sure he wants to adopt the Robb strategy for 
explaining supervenience. In fairness to myself, I should note that he has not 
suggested a particular alternative to Robb’s approach. Moreover, the general 
appeal to ‘whatever works in the philosophy of mind’ seems to make it fair 
game to argue that Robb’s approach is ‘what works’ in the philosophy of 
mind, yet will not work in the case of normative properties. In which case, the 
appeal to companions in guilt should not ease our worries about normative 
supervenience. Finally, of course, apart from Shafer-Landau’s own view, it is 
interesting in its own right to see whether a variation on Robb’s approach
could be made to work in the case of normative properties. 
 I now present four challenges for the defender of this approach. The first 
challenge stems from the fact that the bulk of the explanatory work here is 
done by the thesis that (b*) if a trope constitutes an F-trope, then it neces-
sarily constitutes an F-trope. Why, though, should we take (b*) to be true? 
Constituition is, after all, not identity; that is part of Shafer-Landau’s point. 
Why, though, could we not have the same trope elsewhere without its consti-
tuting the same F-trope it constitutes here? Some further metaphysical work 
needs to be done to vindicate this hypothesis, or as yet we have no explana-
tion of how normative properties could supervene. Note that Robb’s version 
of the argument has an advantage on this score. For Robb can explain the 
analogous thesis that (b) if a trope is an F-trope, then it necessarily is an F-
trope. For this only relies on the necessity of numerical identity, which is 
much more obvious and plausible than the necessity of constitution. 
 The second challenge is unfortunately not one that I can develop in 
sufficient detail here. The challenge reflects the fact that trope theory itself is 
hardly platitudinous. There are serious philosophical worries about the very 
idea of a trope, and indeed about the reification of property instantiations 
 14. Many thanks to Brad Majors for drawing me out on this aspect of the dialectic, 
which is, in my view, all too often submerged as implicit in ways that are confusing in the 
existing debates. Here I also find it instructive to note the analogy with the philosophy of 
mind. If dualism in the philosophy of mind were true then it would be plausible to infer that 
the mental does not necessarily supervene on the physical, as supervenience in this case is 
not analytic. This shows how we can have irreducible properties without supervenience. This 
contrast with the normative suggests an explanatory itch which deserves to be scratched. 
How could there be irreducible properties which nonetheless supervene in the relevant 
ways? Perhaps the challenge can be met, but it cannot be dismissed as not posing a genuine 
challenge once we distinguish the issue of supervenience itself qua trifling analytic truth 
from the metaphysical question of how there could be normative properties with the modal 
profile entailed by supervenience. 
 © 2007 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution.
 by Fabian Freyenhagen on November 2, 2007 http://mpj.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
344 JOURNAL OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 4.3 (2007) 
more generally, quite apart from the trope framework. It is true, of course, 
that properties are instantiated, but we must not directly infer from this that 
there are property instantiations any more than we should infer from the 
fact that it is true that people do things for the sake of others that there are 
sakes.15 To be clear, the worry here is about the very idea that we should 
reify property instantiations at all, and not whether we should adopt this or 
that theory of them, much less whether we should call them ‘tropes’. A 
traditional theory of universals might well get by with just objects and their 
properties without bloating its ontology with property instantiations as a 
third sort of fundamental entity.16
 This is, of course, not the place for a general discussion of the plausibility 
of trope theory. Suffice it to say that the Shafer-Landau strategy gives some 
serious hostages to metaphysical fortune. Indeed, the hostages to fortune are 
not just the fortunes of trope theory, but of meta-trope theory. For Shafer-
Landau’s argument will also rely on the idea that instantiations of properties 
can themselves have properties in order to make sense of the idea that a fact 
(which just is a property instantiation on Shafer-Landau’s view) can have the
property of being a reason. Understanding meta-properties in the trope frame-
work may lead to more specific problems, and not all trope theorists may be 
inclined to posit meta-tropes in their ontology. In any event, if expressivism
allows us to explain supervenience without such hostages to metaphysical 
fortune, then that makes expressivism ex ante a theoretically safer bet than 
anti-reductionist cognitivism.  
 The third challenge stems from the fact that the proffered explanation of
supervenience potentially has the odd and somewhat implausible consequence
of ruling out certain forms of monism as a first-order view. Historically, anti-
reductionist views have been understood as neutral on such first-order ques-
tions, though. Indeed, this is in a way one of the main virtues of anti-reduc-
tionism. Because it is entirely neutral on the first-order questions of the day, 
it can much better accommodate the sorts of intuitions that underwrite the 
force of G.E. Moore’s Open Question Argument. 
 Why do I say that Shafer-Landau’s explanation potentially rules out 
certain forms of monism? Because according to trope nominalism, a property 
just is a set of resembling tropes. Whether a given property is normative or 
descriptive depends entirely on whether the relevant resemblances are norma-
tive or descriptive (the ‘or’ is inclusive). Anti-reductionism just is the thesis 
that normative properties are not identical with descriptive properties, how-
ever. In the context of trope nominalism, this means that the tropes that 
make up a given normative property cannot resemble one another in ways 
that would be salient from a purely descriptive perspective. 
 Somewhat surprisingly, this is enough to rule out certain forms of norma-
tive monism. For normative monism will hold that just one kind of fact can 
 15. This is an old point of Quine’s.  
 16. Thanks to Brad Majors for useful discussion here. 
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constitute a reason, and the tropes that make up this sort of fact may well be 
ones that resemble each other in important ways from a purely descriptive
point of view. For example, take a simple form of egoistic hedonism, according 
to which a fact is a reason for an agent to perform an action just in case it is a 
fact to the effect that the action would promote the agent’s pleasure. The
property of promoting one’s own pleasure may, though, be highly salient 
from a purely descriptive point of view; in which case the tropes which make 
up this property will indeed resemble one another in ways that are salient 
from a purely descriptive point of view. After all, empirical psychology may 
well make heavy use of this property in explaining the actions of intentional 
agents, for a start. This, in turn, would entail that the property of being a 
reason is, after all, a descriptive property, which is inconsistent with anti-
reductionism.
 The anti-reductionist has at least two replies. The first is just to ‘bite the 
bullet’, and perhaps be so bold as to claim as a virtue for his theory that it 
allows us to refute egoism! This, though, would be to bite the dialectical 
hand that feeds you. For ruling out egoism on purely metaethical grounds 
seems incompatible with the spirit, if not the letter, of G.E. Moore’s Open 
Question Argument, which is itself perhaps the strongest argument for anti-
reductionism in the first place. 
 The second anti-reductionist reply to the objection from monism is to 
reject the trope nominalist’s account of what makes a property count as being 
of one type rather than another (physical versus mental; normative versus 
descriptive). Rejecting the trope nominalist’s attempt to reduce universals to 
sets of tropes, the reply will insist that we must posit universals as existing in 
their own right, above and beyond the set of all of their instantiations. The 
anti-reductionist is on this horn of the dilemma driven quite literally to some-
thing like Plato’s Form of the Good, their frequent attempts to distance 
themselves from that model notwithstanding.
 This may seem more plausible than ‘biting the bullet’, with respect to 
certain forms of monism. However, this move also may be seen as biting the 
dialectical hand that feeds you, albeit a different hand this time. For many of 
those who argue for trope theory do so on the grounds that trope nominalism 
allows us to avoid some of the metaphysically excesses of a theory of uni-
versals. If we are driven to a theory that posits universals anyway, then we 
may have trouble mounting a good argument for trope theory in the first 
place. The appeal to ‘companions in guilt’ may now begin to look more like 
an appeal for help from some fair weather friends who have no interest in 
sharing your pain.  
 The fourth challenge for the defender of this strategy for explaining super-
venience is that it seems to force us to reject a doctrine Jonathan Dancy has 
called ‘holism about reasons’.17 Holism about reasons maintains that a fact 
 17. See, for example, J. Dancy, Ethics Without Principles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004).
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which is a reason in one situation may be no reason at all, or a reason with 
the opposite valence, in another sort of situation. For example, the fact that 
watching TV would be pleasant may be a reason here, but that very same 
fact may not be a reason in an other situation, as when the pleasure would 
be sadistic (in watching news about some tragedy, say). 
 Holism about reasons is controversial in some quarters, but I think it is 
very plausible. One way of seeing its plausibility is that we do not typically 
think of all reasons as being partially constituted by the fact that the agent is 
able to perform the action in question. My reason to visit my mother is that 
it will make her happy, not that it will make her happy and I can visit her. 
Yet, plausibly ‘there is a reason’ entails ‘can’ in much the same way that 
‘ought’ implies ‘can’. This is already enough to establish a modest form of 
holism. For this entails that what is a reason here may not be a reason there 
if I can perform the action here, but not there.  
 Finally, of course, even if holism is false, it is hardly obviously false. Once 
again, the anti-reductionist had better not bite the dialectical hand that feeds 
it and rule out of court an interesting first-order view like this on purely meta-
normative grounds. For that would be deeply alien to the intuitions which 
make the Open Question Argument as an argument for anti-reductionism 
plausible in the first place. 
 Why, though, do I suggest that Shafer-Landau’s strategy as I have recon-
structed it forces us to reject holism about reasons? Recall that in order to 
explain supervenience, Shafer-Landau’s strategy required the following 
auxiliary thesis: (b*) if a trope constitutes an F-trope, then it necessarily 
constitutes an F-trope. Suppose a given fact constitutes a reason. From (b*), 
it follows that this fact necessarily constitutes a reason whenever it obtains, 
regardless of context. This, though, just is the rejection of holism. 
 Dancy himself is aware that his theory threatens to make supervenience 
mysterious, and offers the following explanation of supervenience: 
My final question about supervenience is how to explain it… What then explains 
the fact that moral properties supervene on the non-moral? My own view is that 
this is a consequence of the fact that they result from the non-moral. The 
properties from which the wrongness of this action results are the reasons why it 
is wrong, the ground for its wrongness. Now we know already that if we move to 
another case holding just these properties fixed, we may yet get an action that is 
not wrong; differences elsewhere may conspire to prevent the original wrong-
making properties from doing that job in the new case. But if we move to another 
case holding fixed all the non-moral properties of the case whatever, we know in advance 
that no conspiracy of that sort can happen. Whatever was a reason in the first case 
must remain a reason in the second, and nothing that was not a reason in the 
first can become a reason in the second. So necessarily the reasons must remain 
the same, and if so, their rational result must remain the same.18
 18. Dancy, Ethics Without Principles, p. 89; emphasis added. 
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The key move for our purposes comes in the sentence I have italicized. This 
is enough to entail supervenience, but it hardly looks like an explanation of 
supervenience. For the italicized sentence just asserts a form of superveni-
ence—that there can be no moral difference without some non-moral differ-
ence ‘conspiring’ to make the difference. You cannot explain supervenience 
by stating it.
 This last objection—that the explanation on offer is incompatible with 
holism—is forceful enough by itself, but it is even more forceful when 
combined with the point about monism. For now we seem inexorably led to 
a very specific first-order normative theory simply in virtue of accepting anti-
reductionism and its apparently best explanation of supervenience. For on 
the one hand, we must reject monism, and hence must accept a plurality of 
types of reasons. On the other hand, though, we must also reject the view 
that reasons can function holistically. In effect, we seem driven to an atom-
istic version of something like W.D. Ross’s theory of prima facie duties.19
 Such a Rossian view may well be a plausible view, though I doubt that the 
atomistic part of the view is all that plausible (see above). Even if the view 
itself is plausible, what is not plausible, given the Open Question Argument 
from which non-naturalism draws its plausibility, is that our metanormative 
theory alone could drive us to hold such a specific sort of view about the 
structure of our reasons.  
Conclusion
In this essay, I have tried to do three main things. First, I have tried to show 
that so long as we are willing to characterize the subvenient base disjunc-
tively, it is after all possible to formulate supervenience in a way that does 
not beg any central metaethical questions. Second, I have tried to clarify the 
structure of the challenge to anti-reductionists to explain supervenience, and 
in this context have discussed whether the putative analyticity of superveni-
ence poses any additional dialectical burdens on the anti-reductionist. I there 
conclude that the anti-reductionist can accommodate the analyticity of super-
venience but then a new challenge emerges, namely to explain why we have 
predicates just like our normative predicates but which do not take superveni-
ence as axiomatically analytic. To my knowledge, this particular gloss on the 
issue of analyticity has not been discussed before. Third, most centrally, I 
have posed four related challenges for what I take to be the most interesting 
attempt to date by normative anti-reductionists (namely, Shafer-Landau’s 
attempt) to explain supervenience in genuinely anti-reductionist terms. By 
way of summary, those four challenges are: 
 19. See W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003 
[1930]).
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 1. A dilemma: Either explain why we should reject trope nominalism 
(and hence why the Robb strategy for explaining supervenience in 
the philosophy of mind is not the best strategy here too) or explain 
why trope nominalism plus the proffered explanation does not 
implausibly entail the rejection of monism. Either of these options 
threatens to ‘bite the dialectical hand that feeds the anti-reduction-
ist’. On the one hand there is the spirit of the Moorean intuitions 
behind the Open Question Argument, which would counsel against 
a direct metaphysical argument against monism. On the other 
hand, there is the fact that the main force of the original argument 
was an appeal to companions in guilt; once we are more selective 
about which companions we invoke, though, we need an argument 
that we are not hanging out ‘with the wrong crowd’. In any event, 
note how little ice the ‘this is just like in the philosophy of mind’ 
explanation is cutting now. We need a lot more argument about 
just which of the available stories in the philosophy of mind is the 
right one for the anti-reductionist in metanormative theory—and 
the anti-reductionist may be forced to say ‘not the trope nominal-
ism theory’ and ‘not a standard universals theory’ either, but 
instead ‘a universals plus tropes theory’. Needless to say, its not 
obvious that this is the right story in the philosophy of mind, in 
which case ‘companions’ arguments really do not advance the anti-
reductionist position very far. 
 2. Provide some explanation of why we should reify tropes. Why not 
go for a more elegant metaphysic that posits only universals and 
objects which instantiate them, and doesn’t bloat its ontology with 
property instantiations as well? This challenge may be especially 
forceful if the reply to point (1) above is to take the horn of the 
dilemma which rejects trope nominalism. For one of the main 
arguments for tropes is that given trope nominalism they allow us 
to avoid the problems associated with a theory of universals. 
 3. Mount a defence of the assumption that if a property constitutes 
another property then it necessarily does. This assumption seems 
to do the lion’s share of the explanatory work, but is in Shafer-
Landau’s discussion a suppressed premise which gets no defence. 
 4. Explain why this explanatory strategy does not lead all too quickly 
to the rejection of holism, or why its so leading is not problematic.  
 I do not pretend to have demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt that 
these four challenges cannot be met. Taken together, though, they strike me 
as posing a rather deep challenge for an attempt to explain supervenience in 
terms of a constitution relation between property instantiations. In any 
event, in my view, the ball is now in the anti-reductionist’s court. 
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